The study of how people use subjective probabilities is a remarkably modern concern, and was largely motivated by the increasing use of expert judgment during and after World War II (Cooke, 1991). Experts are often asked to quantify the likelihood of events such as a stock market collapse, a nuclear plant accident, or a presidential election (Ayton, 1992; Baron, 1998; Hammond, 1996). For applications such as these, it is essential to know how the probabilities experts attach to various outcomes match the relative frequencies of those outcomes; that is, whether experts are properly “calibrated.” Despite this, relatively few studies have evaluated how well descriptive theories of probabilistic reasoning capture the behavior of experts in their natural environment. In this chapter, we examine the calibration of expert probabilistic predictions “in the wild” and assess how well the heuristics and biases perspective on judgment under uncertainty can account for the findings. We then review alternate theories of calibration in light of the expert data.
Calibration and Miscalibration
Miscalibration presents itself in a number of forms. Figure 39.1 displays four typical patterns of miscalibrated probability judgments. The solid diagonal line, identity line, or line of perfect calibration, indicates the set of points at which judged probability and relative frequency coincide. The solid line marked A, where all judgments are higher than the corresponding relative frequency, represents overprediction bias. The solid line B, where all judgments are lower than the corresponding relative frequency, represents underprediction bias.